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Introduction 
The stickiness, real or nominal, of wages has been a central issue in macroeconomics 
since at least the 1930s.  Without some rigidity it seems difficult to explain why 
monetary policy is often found to have real effects in the short-run and without real 
wage rigidity it is hard to explain why real wages seem to have rather low cyclicality 
relative to employment and unemployment.  We think it fair to say that there remains, 
to this day, no widespread consensus on the subject and it remains an active area for 
research. 
In recent years that research has turned its attention to the explosion in the 
availability of microeconomic data.  That is understandable as there is probably a 
limited amount that can be concluded from an analysis of aggregate wages alone.  
Examples of such initiatives are the International Wage Flexibility Project run by the 
Brookings Institution (see Dickens et al, 2006, 2009, for a summary of this) and the 
Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) run by the European Central Bank (ECB) (see 
ECB, 2009, for a summary of this).    
However the increasing availability of micro data has created as well as solved 
problems as the complexity of this data has made it unclear how to interpret it for the 
purposes of understanding wage rigidity.  When working with an aggregate wage 
series one can maintain the assumption that this is the only wage in the economy, the 
one represented by `w’ in the macro-model that is also the shadow cost of labour to 
employers.  But, when confronted with the richness of micro-data, matters become 
more complicated.  If all types of wage data showed similar patterns of rigidity, then 
one could reasonably assume this to be the rigidity in the shadow cost of labour.  But, 
it is becoming apparent that different types of wage data show different degrees of 
wage rigidity and the question then arises as to which is the more appropriate measure 
of the shadow price of labour.   There are three broad types of micro-data on wages 
whose rigidity has been investigated in the literature. 
First, there are, studies of wage settlements, either from databases or from 
surveys of firms (e.g. Blinder and Choi, 1990; Bewley, 2002 or that conducted by the 
ECB as part of its WDN programme – see ECB, 2009).  These indicate that nominal 
wage cuts are extremely rare - for example, ECB (2009) found that only 2.3% of 
firms reported ever cutting wages in the 5 years preceding the survey (which was in 
2008).  However, in the crisis wage cuts in some countries have been more frequent 
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than this.  These studies also generally find that wages are adjusted infrequently, most 
commonly annually in a fixed month (that varies across firms)1 .   
Secondly, there are studies of the base wages received by individuals either 
from social security data (e.g. Lunnemann and Wintr, 2009, for Luxembourg; 
Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir, 2014, for Iceland) or from surveys that are used to 
construct aggregate wage indices (Le Bihan, Montornes and Heckel, 2012, for 
France).  Like the studies of settlements, these studies tend to find evidence for 
nominal wage rigidity and occasional rather than continual increases in wages.  The 
studies of settlements and base wages are broadly consistent and suggest that the 
shadow cost of labour to employers has considerable rigidity. 
In contrast, analyses of individual data on actual earnings often find 
considerable volatility in wages, including a sizeable proportion of wage cuts – see, 
for example, Card and Hyslop (1996), Altonji and Devereux (2000), Gottschalk 
(2005), Barratieri et al (2014) for the US or Smith (2000), Nickell and Quintini 
(2003), Elsby (2009) for the UK, Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) for Europe).  These 
studies often do find some evidence, after discarding ‘problematic’ observations, for 
nominal wage rigidity.  But it can be that a high fraction of observations are discarded 
and there is a concern that some meaningful wage flexibility is hidden in the 
discarded observations.  
The difference in conclusions between studies based on individual and 
settlement/base wage data is most commonly reconciled by assuming that much of the 
observed individual level wage volatility is measurement error i.e. not real. This line 
of argument has been pursued most thoroughly by Gottschalk (2005) and Barratieri, 
Basu and Gottschalk (2014).  And because this wage volatility is not real it is easy to 
then argue that this wage volatility does not affect the shadow price of labour to 
employers and, consequently, should not have any allocational consequences.  
Implicitly it is argued that the studies based on settlements and base wages are most 
informative about rigidity in the shadow cost of labour to employers. 
If however, some of the volatility in actual earnings is real and not just 
measurement error then there is an open question about whether this volatility has 
allocational consequences.  Although most studies of individual wage data use self-
reported earnings that are very likely to contain substantial measurement error, the 
1 Olivei and Tenreyro (2010) show how differences across countries in the timing of response to 
monetary shocks can be linked to different seasonal patterns in wage-setting. 
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study of Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2014) uses very high-quality social security 
data and shows that actual wage payments (even after excluding overtime) do show 
much less rigidity and more volatility than base wages.  And, in contrast to base 
wages, the actual wage measure is the payment from employers to workers so might 
be expected to influence employment decisions. 
The first contribution of this paper is to add to this small literature on the 
volatility in actual payments from employers to workers.  It uses the UK’s Monthly 
Wages and Salaries Survey (MWSS) to investigate the patterns in earnings changes at 
the firm-level and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to provide added information about 
wage volatility at the individual level.  We do find considerable volatility in actual 
wage payments which, as they are real payments from employers to workers, we 
might expect it to have allocational consequences.   
The second contribution of the paper is to provide a theoretical argument for 
what should be used as the shadow cost of labour to employers.  We argue that the 
volatility in actual wages is largely transitory in nature, and that this can exist because 
labour market frictions (caused by hiring and, possibly, firing costs) mean there are 
typically rents in the employment relationship.  In the presence of these rents, the true 
shadow cost of labour will be influenced only to a small degree by the large transitory 
fluctuations observed in the payments from employers to workers, and, as a 
consequence the allocational consequence will be small.  For deciding on the extent of 
volatility in the shadow price of labour it is likely that base wages may be better 
measures of the ‘permanent’ wage. 
This conclusion has certain parallels in the literature on price rigidity.  There 
the early studies simply measured the frequency of price changes (e.g. Bils and 
Klenow, 2004), with the presumption that price changes, when they occur, must be 
with the purpose of balancing demand and supply.  But it was pointed out that many 
observed price changes are temporary i.e. like ‘sales’ that would not seem to be 
motivated by the balancing of demand and supply (e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson, 
2008).  Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) present a model in which there is a reason for 
sales and show that the counting of price changes is not a realistic guide to the extent 
to which monetary policy has real effects.  Similarly, here, it is argued that earnings 
data has real volatility that is unrelated to wage flexibility that allocates labour . 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section describes the UK’s 
Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (MWSS). The second section then documents 
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the remarkable amount of transitory movements in paybill per head in this data set, 
the main new empirical stylized fact shown in this paper.  The third section then 
investigates possible reasons for this, discussing measurement error, employment 
fluctuations, hours variation (using the LFS) and individual wage variation as possible 
causes. The conclusion is that although hours variation and employment fluctuations 
can explain some of the observed wage volatility there remains a considerable amount 
that cannot be explained.  The fourth section shows that, in spite of the large observed 
volatility in wages we do note that one can detect an annual pattern in wage growth, 
consistent with annual pay settlements and survey evidence. Finally the fifth section 
offers a simple model to assess the importance of the wage volatility for flexibility in 
the shadow cost of labour to firms. 
Our conclusion is that there is considerable transitory volatility in the 
payments from employers to workers but that this is likely to have only small effect 
on the allocation of labour because of frictions in the labour market.  Measures of 
base wages are likely to be more informative about rigidity in the shadow cost of 
labour to employers. 
1. The Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey
The Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (MWSS) is a survey conducted by
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) of approximately 9,000 businesses per month 
in Great Britain. It started in 1989 but underwent a major re-design in 1999 so we use 
data for the period January 2000 to May 2010 inclusive, though not all variables are 
available for this entire period.  The MWSS is carried out monthly so its data are 
much higher frequency than data used in most other papers on the topic of wage 
flexibility2. Given that most UK workers are now paid by the month it is not 
meaningful to go to a higher frequency.   
The sampled businesses are required by law to return the MWSS. The sample 
is selected from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR), a comprehensive 
register of UK businesses used by the government for statistical purposes. Every 
business with more than 1,000 employees is surveyed every month. Below this 
2 Lunnemann and Wintr, (2009) and Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2014) are the only other papers we 
have been able to find with monthly data.  The matched employer-employee data sets that are 
increasingly common (e.g. Barth et al, 2011, for the US LEHD and Card, Heining and Kline, 2013, for 
the German IAB data) have –at best – quarterly information on earnings and often it is aggregated to 
the annual level. 
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threshold, sampling is random. However, employers with fewer than 20 employees 
are not sampled.  Once selected into the sample these employers remain in it for 5 
years.  The unit of response is what is known as a ‘reporting unit’.  For single-
establishment firms this is both a firm and an establishment (which is known in the 
jargon as a ‘local unit’).  For multi-establishment firms, the reporting unit (typically 
the head office) is defined as the aggregation of the associated local units.  So the unit 
of observation is the firm rather than an establishment though we can identify which 
firms have only one establishment. 
The data from the MWSS are used to produce the Average Weekly Earnings 
and the Average Earnings Index, the main macroeconomic series on earnings used in 
the UK3.  The MWSS collects total gross pay from individual firms for both weekly-
paid and monthly-paid staff, as well as total bonus payments and any pay arrears. In 
our analysis we use the paybill excluding bonuses and arrears – inclusion of these 
other payments simply adds to the volatility as one would expect.    Information on 
employment is also collected and we use this to compute average earnings per head 
for weekly- and monthly-paid staff.  We have this information for the period May 
2000 to December 2008 inclusive.  For a longer sample period – January 2000 to May 
2010 - we also have a combined measure of total pay bill and total employment (the 
monthly-paid wage bill is multiplied by 84/365 to convert to a weekly basis).  This 
means we have up to three measures of weekly earnings – separately for weekly and 
monthly-paid workers and for the aggregate.   
Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  Almost all plants have 
some monthly-paid staff but less than half have any weekly-paid staff.  As one would 
expect, average weekly earnings are lower for the weekly-paid than for the monthly-
paid.  For overall average weekly earnings, the monthly-paid staff are much more 
important being over 75% of total employment on average and 80% of the total wage 
bill.  Figure 1 also shows the mean log wage growth for each month in the sample.  
The mean is 0.3% per month, corresponding to an annual rate of 3.6%, what we 
would expect for this sample period.  Notice that this is a period in which wage 
growth was fairly constant pre-crisis but then fell.  However, there are marked 
3 The closest equivalent series for the US, the Employment Cost Index, is collected using a very 
different methodology.  See LeBow, Saks and Wilson (2003) for a study of wage flexibility underlying 
this survey. 
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seasonal fluctuations.  But this aggregate stability hides a lot of variability at the 
micro level as the next section documents. 
2. Wage Volatility in the Monthly Wage and Salary Survey
In this section we present some basic statistics designed to convey some sense of 
the size of earnings volatility in the data.  The main variable used is the month-on-
month change in log average pay bill per head – with some abuse of language we call 
this the percentage increase in earnings.  We also consider the change in earnings over 
a period longer than a month. 
Table 2 presents some basic statistics on the distribution of the monthly 
change in earnings.  The first panel shows the results for all workers, the second panel 
for weekly-paid workers and the third panel for monthly-paid workers.  The first 
column presents the unweighted distribution and the second column an employment-
weighted distribution.  The employment weights we use are from the IDBR – this is a 
data source for employment independent of MWSS so will not induce measurement 
error through division bias (though the IDBR size classification may itself have some 
measurement errors).  The unweighted distribution shows a very high prevalence of 
earnings cuts (46.8%) while the employment-weighted distribution shows a lower 
incidence (46.0%) indicating that there is less variation in earnings changes in larger 
firms, something we will verify and attempt to explain later.  This is not surprising 
given that plant-level average earnings will be affected by changes in hours and 
employment composition so would be unlikely to show a ‘spike’ at a zero change.  
For this reason, we focus on the distribution of earnings changes.  It is 
remarkable that there are some extremely large changes in log average earnings 
reported.  For example, for all workers the 5th percentile is -12.6 log points and the 
95th percentile is 13.2 log points.  Panel B of Table 2 shows that there is more 
volatility in average earnings among the weekly-paid but Panel C shows that the 
overall variation among the monthly-paid is quite similar to that for all workers (as 
one would expect given that Table 1 showed that monthly-paid workers make up most 
of employment and the paybill).  There is no particular time series pattern to the 
fraction of wage cuts – the fraction reporting wage cuts bigger than 5% each month is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Table 2 also presents data on wage volatility over longer time horizons - 3, 6 
and 12 months.  Because earnings are rising on average the incidence of wage cuts 
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falls as one lengthens the time horizon – one can explain this largely by the upward 
trend in the average level of earnings.  But there remains a lot of volatility even over 
the 12-month horizon. 
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of earnings changes by plant size where 
plant size is defined using the categories in the IDBR i.e. a different data source from 
the MWSS.  As one can see there is less dispersion in earnings changes in large firms 
for all workers and the monthly-paid though little difference for the weekly-paid.  
However, earnings volatility is still very marked even in the largest employers.  The 
second and third columns of Table 4 split the sample into public and private sectors – 
there is more earnings volatility in the private than public sectors but there is still 
quite a lot in the public sector e.g. the 5th percentile of monthly changes in log average 
earnings is -0.05 and the 95th percentile 0.059.  As we know there are no actual wage 
cuts in the public sector this should be an indication that further investigation is 
needed. 
One might be interested in whether these cuts in earnings are temporary or 
permanent.  One way to get some idea of this is to look at the autocovariance function 
and/or correlogram for earnings changes.  The autocovariance function for the three 
measures of log weekly earnings is presented in Figure 3a and the correlogram in 
Figure 3b where we go up to lags of 30 months i.e. 2.5 years.  These are computed 
using all available observations but the results are very similar if one includes only a 
balanced panel.  There are a number of features of Figure 3a worth noting. First one 
can see the greater volatility in the earnings of weekly-paid staff but that the volatility 
in the total is closer to the volatility in the earnings of the monthly-paid staff.  But 
what is also very striking is the negative covariance between wage changes this month 
and last month.  This suggests that a lot of the wage volatility in monthly earnings 
growth results from very temporary shocks to the level of monthly earnings.  This is 
true for all three measures of earnings and Figure 3b shows that the auto-correlogram 
is similar for all three earnings measures.  It is also noticeable that there is a positive 
covariance at the yearly frequency indicating the importance of seasonal effects.  And 
that correlations other than the first lag and yearly lags are very close to zero.  A 
simple model that does a good job in explaining earnings is one in which ‘permanent’ 
earnings follow a random walk with some seasonal component and there are 
transitory shocks to the level of earnings.  If we ignore the seasonal effects this can be 
written as: 
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it t it itw u      (1)
Where t  is a time effect, it  a transitory shock to earnings growth and itu  a 
transitory shock to the level of earnings.  This evidence provides clues about the 
likely explanation of the observed volatility in earnings, namely that it represents very 
transitory shocks.  That should immediately indicate to us that the source is not 
perhaps wage cuts of the type economists have in mind as being necessary to clear 
labour markets. 
This section has documented a large amount of high-frequency volatility in 
average earnings per head at firm level4.  We now turn to consider explanations.  
Although much of the literature aims to explain wage cuts we focus our attention on 
measures of volatility like the standard deviation in earnings growth.  With the firm-
level data at our disposal this seems more appropriate.  
3. Explanations for the Observed Wage Volatility
The over-riding impression from the MWSS data is that there is a lot of high-
frequency volatility in earnings per head at the plant level.  There are a number of 
possible explanations for this and, in this section, we try to evaluate them.  We put 
them in three categories – measurement error, volatility caused by changes in the 
composition of employment, and volatility in individual earnings (that might be 
caused by volatility in hours or in earnings per hour). We consider these in turn. 
a. Measurement Error
First, there is measurement error – it may simply be that the data is wrong.
One might be inclined to this view because of the apparent transitory nature of the 
shock to earnings indicated by the correlogram of Figure 3a.  The measurement error 
interpretation of observed transitory volatility in earnings has been pursued most 
actively by Gottschalk (2005) and Battieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) and most 
studies of wage flexibility using individual data take steps to mitigate the effects of 
measurement error on their findings. 
Of course there must be some element of truth in this explanation as all data 
sets do contain measurement error though the extent of the problem will vary across 
4 This complements studies of the volatility of individual earnings, typically at 1 or 2-year frequencies 
– see, for example, Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009), Shin and Solow (2011), Ziliak et al (2011) for the
US and Dickens (2000), and Cappelari and Jenkins (2013) for the UK. 
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datasets.  But, there are a number of reasons to think that the earnings volatility in the 
MWSS is not primarily measurement error.  First, one might expect that measurement 
error in this type of data comes from approximation, that firms cannot be bothered to 
find out exactly their paybill and employment in any month and simply report a rough 
estimate.  If this was the case we might expect to see rounding in responses but we do 
not.  Table 5 shows the proportion of observations in which there is rounding in 
responses and the bottom line is that there is no evidence for rounding.  In fact, it is 
extraordinary how precise are many of the answers. 
This precision derives from the nature of the survey.  Large firms who have to 
respond every month normally automate their submission to make it a dump from the 
payroll database.  This is then submitted to the ONS.  On the ONS end they are 
conscious of the volatility documented here and flag up any outliers and go back to 
the firms to query it and clarify the reason.  There is often a long-term personal 
relationship between the person in the ONS and the person submitting the information 
from the firm.  
The history of the survey also suggests that measurement error cannot explain 
everything.  While the volatility in earnings might be largely unknown to economists 
there is indication that those involved with the construction and use of the aggregate 
earnings indices derived from it are aware of the phenomenon and, while their first 
inclination was to think it reflected poor data quality (their equivalent of the 
academics’ measurement error) the phenomenon has persisted even after the best 
attempts to eliminate it.  From the perspective of a user of the aggregate earnings 
series, the problem is that the volatility in the underlying micro data is so large as to 
have non-trivial implications for the aggregate series in some situations5.  In the late 
1990s institutions like the Bank of England were highly critical of the Average 
Earnings Index because it felt that it was not fit for their purposes.  This led to the 
Turnbull-King Report to the Government (Sedgwick and Weale, 1999, Chambers, 
Weale and Youll, 2000) that made a number of suggestions for improving the index.  
But none of these suggestions have eliminated the volatility and the ONS is still faced 
with the problem of a lot of volatility that, even after close investigation, seems to be 
real. 
5 Outliers are actively investigated and sometimes eliminated from the published aggregate series if 
their influence on the aggregate is judged to be unduly large. 
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Nonetheless, there is some indication that some of the responses reflect 
measurement error.   Some establishments report extremely large changes in 
employment and the mean of the absolute value of the monthly turnover rate is 4%, 
much too large to be compatible with what we know about worker flows and other 
measures of job reallocation in the UK.  But this is caused by a few extremely large 
outliers – the median absolute turnover rate (a measure of job reallocation) is a much 
more plausible 1.1% per month.  It is also worth noting that these outliers in 
employment changes also tend to report very large absolute values of changes in log 
average earnings – as indicated in columns (4) through (6) of Table 6.  One possible 
explanation for these outliers is an instability of the ‘reporting unit’ – that suddenly 
the reporting unit changes to encompass a different number of local units.  This would 
tend to produce a large sudden change in employment associated with large reported 
changes in earnings per head.  However, over 90% of reporting units have the same 
local units over a period of 10 years.  
However, it is clear that even if one excludes these ‘suspect’ observations, there 
remains a large amount of earnings volatility – the third column of Table 6 shows that 
the standard deviation in monthly earnings growth is 0.067 for those establishments 
that report no change in employment so are unlikely to have changes in reporting 
units.  And the last two columns show that the volatility remains substantial for 
single-plant firms even after excluding those that report very large changes in 
employment.  Hence it seems very likely that much of the observed volatility is real 
and reflects the actual payments in a given month from an employer to her workers.  
We now move on to a consideration of the reasons for this.  
b. Changes in the Composition of Employment
Earnings per head will change when the composition of employment changes
in such a way as to alter the average earnings of workers.  Let us consider how much 
volatility we would expect such changes to induce6.  Suppose there is variation in 
earnings across workers within a firm and that the variance of earnings within the firm 
is given by 2w .  Suppose there are N workers in the firm and that each of them quits 
6 The best way to estimate the importance of the changing composition of employment would be to use 
matched employer-employee data that is increasingly available in many countries (see, for example, 
Barth et al, 2011; Card, Heining and Kline, 2013) though not the UK.  But, with few exceptions (e.g. 
Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir, 2014) this data is at best available at quarterly and often only annual 
frequencies limiting the potential use for investigating the issues discussed in this paper. 
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each month with probability q. Assume any worker who quits is replaced within the 
month so that the overall employment in the firm remains constant (one could also 
consider the case where there is no replacement of the worker with a similar 
conclusion).  Assume that quits are randomly drawn from within the workforce and 
that new recruits get a wage drawn at random from the wage distribution.  Assume 
that once hired at a particular wage riW , this does not change so that the only possible 
source of change in average earnings per head is from labour turnover.  The change in 
average wages at firm-level, W ,  will be given by: 
1 r
i i ii
W Q W W
N
     (2)
Where iW  is the wage received by worker i  and iQ  is a binary variable taking the 
value 1 if worker i  quits and zero otherwise.  W  has mean zero and the variance is 
given by:  
  22 wqVar W N  (3)
This shows that we would expect the variance in earnings per head to be positively 
related to within-firm wage inequality and the overall turnover rate.  This is because a 
higher turnover rate means more changes in people with more potential for wage 
changes and the greater the within-firm wage inequality the larger this effect will be.  
We also see that volatility should be negatively related to the size of the firm, 
essentially because of a law of large numbers.  A simple way to think about (3) is to 
put some orders of magnitude on it.  Suppose we used a high estimate for labour 
turnover of 2% per month, i.e. a value for q of 0.02.  For a firm with 100 workers we 
would then expect that   0.02 wsd W   .  If we divided by average earnings this 
would tell us that the standard deviation of earnings growth relative to average 
earnings should be one-fiftieth of the coefficient of variation of earnings within the 
firm.  To obtain a standard deviation in earnings growth of 0.06 (the smallest estimate 
in Table 6) requires a coefficient of variation of earnings within the firm of about 3. 
This is much too big as the variation of earnings in the economy as a whole is no 
bigger than 1 and within firms it is very likely to be considerably smaller than that. 
These calculations have been based on some specific assumptions to keep 
things simple that might not be realistic.  But changing them may actually strengthen 
the conclusions.  For example, workers who leave are probably likely to be replaced 
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with a similar worker paid similar wages.  And quits and recruits are concentrated 
among the lower earners and this would also tend to lead to lower volatility in average 
earnings per head as they account for a lower share of the total age bill.  
It is likely that some of the observed volatility in earnings changes that is 
observed in the data is the result of changes in the composition of employment and 
that this is likely to be particularly important in small firms.  But it is also clear that 
this cannot be the explanation for all of the observed volatility. 
c. Volatility in Hours
Because the earnings measure is a weekly measure this can come from variation 
in hours or in hourly earnings.  This section considers hours variation – variation in 
the hourly rate is considered later. Because the MWSS has no hours information  we 
turn to another data set to shed light on this. 
The best source of information on hours variation at the individual level comes 
from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the UK equivalent to the CPS though it has a 
quarterly rather than monthly frequency.  This provides quarterly information on the 
level of actual hours worked, as well as the split of those hours into basic hours, paid 
and unpaid overtime.  Table 7 presents some basic information on the distribution of 
the change in log paid weekly hours over the time intervals one can compute from the 
LFS (quarterly from 3 to 12 months).  The sample is restricted to those who are in the 
same job (those who change jobs report more variability as one would expect) so that 
we have a sample of workers who remain in the same firm - this is what is closest to 
what would be reported in the MWSS. 
Table 7 shows a considerable amount of variation in weekly paid hours at the 
individual level.  If we restrict attention to the 3-month horizon for which we have 
data from both the MWSS and the LFS, the standard deviation in the change log 
weekly hours as reported in the LFS is 0.34 compared to a standard deviation in the 
change in log paybill per head of 0.083 if we use the 3-month weighted volatility from 
the fourth column of Table 2.  Taken at face value the volatility in hours can more 
than explain the observed volatility in earnings. 
However, there are a number of problems in accepting this conclusion.  First, 
not all variation in hours is associated with variation in earnings.  We might expect 
earnings will be proportional to hours (and more than proportional if there is an 
overtime premium) for those who are paid by the hour, but many workers are paid on 
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a monthly basis and their earnings will bear little relationship to hours worked.  The 
final column of Table 7 reports the distribution of the change in reported log weekly 
earnings in the LFS – unfortunately this is only available at a 12-month interval 
because earnings information is only collected in the first and fifth waves (and only 
since 1997).  The standard deviation of the change in log weekly earnings is 
remarkably similar to that for the change in log hours (though the percentiles are 
rather different).  But one cannot conclude that all the variation in the change in log 
weekly earnings is caused by variation in hours. 
To investigate this further Table 8 reports results from regressions of the 
change in log weekly earnings on the change in log weekly hours.  A simple 
regression of the annual difference in log earnings on the difference in log hours for 
all workers has a coefficient on log hours of 0.26.  But if the sample is restricted to 
workers who have not changed jobs this falls to 0.18 so that only one-fifth of the 
variation in hours translates into earnings7.  The third and fourth columns shows that 
this is the result of the fact that many people are not paid by the hour – the estimated 
elasticity for those who are not hourly paid (the third column) is 0.086, while that for 
those who are paid by the hour is 0.239 (still not one).  So if, on average, the response 
of weekly earnings to variation in weekly hours is about 0.25 then a standard 
deviation of 0.34 in individual hours would be expected to translate into a standard 
deviation of 0.085 for weekly earnings.    
However this assumes that all hours variation is at firm-level when it is not.  
Some of the individual variation in hours is due to personal factors that will, by the 
law of large numbers not contribute to firm-level variation in very large firms (though 
will always contribute something to the firm-level variance divided by (1/N).  On the 
other hand, there are firm-level shocks that will affect large numbers of workers 
within the firm – Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2004) report, for US manufacturing 
firms in the 1970s, a quarterly standard deviation in hours growth at plant level of 
0.18.  Absent panel data on multiple workers within firms we cannot investigate this 
precisely but we can get some idea by investigating the reasons for the deviation 
between actual and usual hours when asked in the LFS.  The reasons given are 
tabulated in Table 9 – half the time it is that hours or overtime varies.  Unfortunately 
7 There is an issue of how one interprets this coefficient if one has a classical labour supply model in 
mind.  If the driving force for changes in hours is changes in the hourly pay rate (which it probably 
isn’t) then the reported elasticity should be one plus the labour supply elasticity. 
14 
it is not clear whether this is because the demand for the firm’s output is varying so 
should be interpreted as a firm-level shock, or because one is being asked to cover for 
a sick colleague in which case it is not. 
From the discussion above it should be apparent that while it is likely that a 
non-trivial part of the reported variation in gross weekly earnings does come from 
hours variation, not all of the earnings volatility can be from those sources so is 
variation in pay per hour.   
d. Variation in Individual Earnings
By a process of elimination we have argued that the explanations above cannot 
explain all of the volatility we observe in average earnings – hence we must look at 
volatility in earnings received by individuals.  In this section we present evidence on 
the volatility of earnings at the individual level using the LFS.  We report information 
on three measures of earnings.  First, gross weekly earnings as this is the earnings 
measure closest to that used in the MWSS.  As pointed out above hours variation is 
one potential cause of volatility in weekly earnings.  Secondly we use a derived 
hourly pay measure by dividing gross weekly earnings by a measure of paid hours 
(both basic and overtime).  It is widely recognized that this measure does contain 
sizeable measurement error8 - and part of this is that the earnings and hours measures 
cannot be assumed to refer to the same time period.  Finally, in 1999, a direct question 
on the hourly wage rate was introduced for the approximately 50% of workers who 
report being paid by the hour – obviously this is not a meaningful concept for workers 
who are not paid by the hour. 
The first row of Table 10 presents some measures of the extent of wage volatility 
in weekly earnings, hourly pay and, for those where it exists, the hourly rate.  We 
restrict attention to those who are working for the same employer at both wage 
observations.  As has been reported in other studies, there are sizeable wage cuts and 
a lot of volatility for all three measures though largest for gross weekly earnings.  In 
the more detailed analysis that follows we focus attention on gross weekly earnings 
because that is closest to the individual earnings measure in the MWSS and because 
we observe this measure for all workers. Our strategy in the rest of this section is to 
see how far one can go to reducing the volatility in wage growth. 
8 For example, use of this earnings measure probably led the ONS to overstate the impact of the UK’s 
National Minimum Wage in the late 1990s. 
15 
Of course, much of the volatility observed in Table 10 could be measurement 
error and much of the existing literature that uses earnings reported by individuals 
focuses on this possible explanation.  But, the LFS offers some advantages over 
surveys like the CPS and PSID as it asks about the source of earnings information, 
recording, for example, whether the pay slip has been seen (it is for about 20% of 
workers). It also has information on whether the respondent was a proxy (it is for 
about one-third of workers) and questions about whether earnings were the same as 
usual (it is for about 80% of workers).  Because we have observations on 
earnings/wages at two points in time we might have the pay slip observed at neither, 
either or both observations.  We construct a variable that measures the number of 
times the pay slip has been seen and the number of proxy observations.  The first 
panel of Table 11 then tabulates the standard deviation of the change in log weekly 
earnings by these variables.  As one would expect the fewer times the pay slip is seen 
and if there is a proxy response the greater the variation in reported wage growth.  
One can also note that if the pay slip is seen twice, it makes less difference whether 
there is a proxy response.  The biggest variation may come if there is one personal 
and one proxy response as two proxy responses may mean the same mistake is made 
twice. 
The second panel of Table 11 then reports the incidence of cuts in gross weekly 
earnings.  As one might expect given the previous results, the reported incidence of 
cuts is greater if the pay slip is not seen and there are proxy responses though perhaps 
the differences are not as large as one would expect.  However the final panel of 
Table 11 makes it clear that large earnings cuts are much more frequently reported 
when the pay slip is not seen.  However the incidence of cuts in gross weekly earnings 
greater than 5% remains high at 19% of workers even if pay slips are seen both times 
and there are personal responses. 
To further explore this we restrict the sample in what follows to those individuals 
for whom we observe both pay slips and have zero proxy responses i.e. the group for 
which we would expect measurement error to be the smallest.  The LFS asks a 
question about whether earnings are the same as usual.  The final column of the first 
panel of Table 12 shows that about two-thirds of workers report that both their 
earnings were the same as usual.  Though that still leaves one-third of workers for 
whom at least one of two earnings measures are not the same as usual – these will be 
one source of volatility.  As one might expect, Table 12 shows there is less volatility 
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in earnings and fewer observed earnings cuts among those who report earnings are the 
same as usual.   The most common recorded reason for why earnings differ from 
usual is because of hours variation.  This will obviously be more important for hourly 
paid as compared to salaried workers.  So the bottom two panels of Table 12 split the 
sample into hourly and salaried workers.  The final column shows that 40% of hourly-
paid workers report unusual pay as compared to 25% of salaried workers – hours 
variation is the biggest cause of this discrepancy.  For both hourly and salaried 
workers one sees, as one would expect, greater volatility in earnings for those who 
report unusual earnings and, also, greater volatility in earnings among hourly-paid as 
opposed to salaried workers.  But, even if we restrict attention to those whose pay 
slips are seen, with no proxy responses, who are in the same job and who report both 
earnings to be the same as usual we still have 17% of salaried workers reporting year-
on-year falls in earnings and 9% falls greater than 5%.  So, however hard one looks 
one still finds a sizeable amount of volatility in earnings though most of this variation 
is probably the transitory volatility seen in the MWSS data.    
Our conclusion is that there does seem a surprising amount of volatility in the 
actual wage payments from employers to workers and that it would not be correct to 
think of all of this as simply measurement error.  This conclusion that workers seem 
to experience a lot of volatility in actual wage payments also runs against the ‘implicit 
contract’ literature that argued that wages are smoothed because risk-averse workers’ 
demand for insurance can be met by less risk-averse employers.   If workers demand a 
smooth flow of income means then our proposed explanation for the volatility in 
earnings cannot be correct.  However, workers do absorb a lot of volatility in 
earnings, volatility that is so routine it is not noticed.  When workers are paid by the 
month (or a week), they have to absorb a considerable variation in their income on a 
daily basis.  The transitory shocks we are considering here are smaller than that most 
workers face on a monthly basis and simply accept as a fact of life.  We all manage 
our finances (some better than others) to reflect the fact that we only get paid once a 
month.   
4. Evidence for Annual Wage Settlements
Given the previous discussion one might wonder whether there is any evidence at all 
for wage rigidity in the MWSS.  One form of wage rigidity is the idea of annual wage 
settlements where earnings are raised once a year.  If one thinks that this is likely to 
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always happen in the same month then one would expect to be able to detect this.  We 
know from other sources that not all firms have a settlement in the same month so that 
we need a method to detect firm-specific months. 
Our procedure is the following.  We restrict attention to the 648 firms in a 
sample for whom we observe for at least 105 months.  We then estimate a model for 
earnings growth with dummy variables for each month, excluding the constant and 
allowing for an MA(1) error to reflect our earlier findings.  If a monthly dummy is 
significant we then record that.  This has similarities to the procedure used by 
Gottschalk (2005) and Barattieri et al (2014) to identify increases in wages but is 
based on the assumption that underlying earnings follow a random walk, an 
assumption that seems better for our data.  This methodology has a couple of potential 
problems.  First, there are other reasons apart from annual settlements that would 
cause a seasonal change in paybill per head e.g. if there was a seasonal component to 
demand with associated hours and employment changes.  But we would expect these 
to be temporary so to be associated with a negative effect in the following month.  In 
contrast, annual settlements should not be reversed. 
The pattern of our results is shown in Table 13.  In the first two columns we 
record all the monthly coefficients that are positive and those that are significantly 
different from zero.  We see a concentration of ‘wage settlements’ in April.  The third 
and fourth columns in Table 13 do the same exercise but for negative monthly 
coefficients.  There are more negative than positive coefficients but a lower 
percentage of them are significantly different from zero.  Those that are almost 
certainly reflect seasonal variation in demand – it is in the autumn that they are most 
common.  The final column of Table 13 records the fractions of wage settlements in 
different months in the IDS/IRS and CBI settlements database9.  It is clear that we can 
pick up the concentration of pay settlements in April in our data and the smaller spike 
in July but the concentration in January is harder to detect.  
5. Interpretation and Implications for the Shadow Price of Labour
The previous sections have argued that there is considerable transitory volatility in the 
actual payments from employers to workers, much more than in settlements or base 
wages.  This raises the question of which type of data is more informative about 
9 We are grateful to Peter Dolton for providing this data (see Dolton, Makepeace and Tremayne, 2012, 
for more details on this) 
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rigidity in the shadow price of labour.  In this section, we offer a simple theoretical 
model to explain why large transitory changes in earnings may not be associated with 
large employment changes and to provide a theoretical argument for why base wages 
may be a better measure of the shadow price of labour. 
In this section we present a simple, very stylized, model to answer these 
questions.  Consider a job in which the output produced each period t is constant and 
denoted by Y10.  Assume that the wage each period is given by: 
 1t tW W   (4)
where W is the base wage and t  is a transitory shock to the wage that is assumed iid 
with mean zero and density function  f  .  We will not ask where these shocks 
come from – they will be treated as exogenous.  The intention is to consider how 
much transitory wage volatility can be absorbed without having allocational 
consequences and to decide whether the base wage, W , or the actual current wage 
tW , is more important in influencing employment decisions. 
At the start of each period the job is either filled or vacant.  After t  is 
revealed the employer has to decide whether to fill it this period.  If the job is 
currently vacant but the employer hires a worker then a hiring cost H is incurred.  
Define    to be the value of a filled job if the current transitory shock is .  This is 
defined after the hiring cost has been paid.  Also denote by 0  the value of an empty 
job – this will not depend on   because of the iid assumption.  For simplicity we 
assume there are no firing costs but the existence of such costs would not alter the 
point we want to make11.  Firms will fire the worker if  is higher than some threshold 
value that we denote by f 12.   With these assumptions we can write the value 
function for an employed job as: 
          0max 1 ' ' 1ff fY W dF F                     (5) 
10 This assumption of constant output but varying wages is different from that made by Macleod and 
Malcomson (1993) who consider varying surplus but constant wages.  The different assumptions are 
made to emphasize the point each paper wants to make. 
11 Firing costs are excluded both because they seem less fundamental than hiring costs (e.g. they are the 
product of laws) and are not particularly large in the UK. 
12 For simplicity we only consider a one-sided model in which the worker always wants the job.  It 
would add only complication to model the worker side of the same problem. 
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where   is the discount factor.  It should be obvious that the optimal value of 
f satisfies: 
  0f   (6) 
Now consider the value of an empty job.  Firms will not hire a worker if  is higher 
than some threshold value that we denote by h .  With these assumptions we can 
write the value function for an empty job as:  
     0 0max ' ' 1hh hH dF F                  (7)
It should be obvious that the optimal value of h satisfies: 
  0h H    (8) 
(6) and (8) imply that the thresholds for hiring and firing will be the same if there are 
no hiring costs but differ if there are hiring costs.  Now, consider the form of the value 
functions.  Because   only enters (5) linearly this will be of the form 
   0 *W W          which, combined with (6) and (8) implies that:  
0*f hW W H      (9) 
Now, from (5), *  must satisfy:  
        0 0* 0 * ' 'ffY W F W dF                  (10) 
Using (9), (10) can be written as:  
      
   
0
0
* ' 'ff f
f
Y W W F dF
Y W WG
    
 

         
      

(11)
Where      ' 'G F dF       .  Similarly we can use (9) to write (7) as:  
 0 0 hWG       (12)
Taking the difference of (10) and (12) and using (9) we have that:  
     0*f f fW Y W W G G h              (13)
Where /h H W , the size of hiring costs relative to the base wage.  It is readily 
checked that (13) has a unique solution for f  as the right-hand side has a slope less 
than W as    'G F  .  (13) can be simplified to yield:  
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     f f fY W G G hW           (14)
(14) can be used to address the size of the fluctuation in actual wage payments that 
could be absorbed without causing the employer to fire the worker.  The first term in 
(14) is the proportional difference between the marginal product of labour and the 
base wage and is a lower bound for how much can be absorbed.  If this is 20% then 
(14) says that at least a 20% fluctuation will be absorbed without firing.  The intuition 
for this is straightforward – this much of a shock can be absorbed while the firm still 
makes positive current profits from the worker.   
Of more interest is the second term in (14).  This will be zero if the discount 
factor is zero or hiring costs are zero.  But, otherwise it will be positive.  The intuition 
is that firing the worker means that hiring costs will have to be incurred in the future 
so this acts as a barrier to firing even if current profits from the worker are negative.  
The important point is that this term can be large.  If we take a first-order 
approximation to (14) around f , then we have, using the fact that    'G F  :   
   f fY W F hW     (15)
If we consider a monthly frequency, then   will be close to 1,  fF   is the 
probability of not firing a worker (which is also close to 1 in the data), and h  is the 
ratio of hiring costs to the monthly base wage.  Estimates of hiring costs (see, for 
example, the review in Manning, 2011, Table 2 ).  are often of the order of 50%-150% 
of monthly earnings so this term will be very large, showing how hiring costs can 
explain why there can be large transitory shocks in the wage payments to workers 
without having allocational consequences.  This turns on its head a common argument 
that the existence of rents allows wage rigidity to exist (e.g. Macleod and Malcomson, 
1993; Hall, 2005a,b)  - in our case it is the existence of rents that allows large 
transitory volatility in earnings. 
We are also interested in the relative importance of the base wage and the 
actual current wage in influencing hiring decisions i.e. what is the appropriate shadow 
price of labour.  A worker will be hired if: 
0* 0tW hW     (16)
Using (13) this can be written as:  
      0t f fY W W G G h Wh          (17)
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Notice that this depends on the actual current wage and, if the firm does not care 
about the future or there are no hiring costs, it is only the current wage that is relevant.  
But, in general, (17) also depends on the base wage which appears directly in (17) and 
also influences f .  Note that (17) will be homogeneous of degree 1 in  , , tY W W .  
We are interested in the relative importance of the base wage and current wage in 
influencing hiring decisions.  From inspection of (17) one can see that the current 
wage has a derivative of 1 in this expression and the question we are interested in is 
how this compares with the derivative with respect to the base wage, W .  The 
derivative of  (17) with respect to the base wage is given by:  
        ff f f fh G G h W F F h W                    (18)
From (14) we have that:  
 







W F F h

  
       
(19)
So that (18) can be written as:  
          










F F hYh G G h
W F F h
F F hYh F
W F F h
       
      
              
             
(20)
The important point is that when employers discount future profits at a reasonable rate 
and hiring costs are reasonably large so that it is much more difficult to be hired than 
fired, then this derivative can be much larger in absolute terms than 1, so that the base 
wage can be thought of as more influential than the actual current wage payment in 
the hiring decision.  One can use this argument to justify focusing on rigidity in wage 
settlements or base wages as being more informative about the extent of rigidity in the 
shadow cost of labour to employments than micro data on actual wage payments. 
This model has focused only the firm side in the interests of simplicity.  But, 
one can readily introduce the worker side.  If the labour market is frictionless workers 
will quit jobs whenever the current wage is below their outside option – this will act 
to limit the amount of transitory wage volatility in any given job.  But when there are 
frictions and it takes time and/or money to get another job, workers will be prepared 
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to absorb large transitory fluctuations in earnings without quitting.  The value of a job 
to a worker will be a function of the permanent and transitory component of the wage 
with a greater weight on the former. 
This model has made the point that the existence of rents (caused in the model 
by hiring costs) means that large transitory fluctuations in the wage can be absorbed 
without allocational consequences13.    This also means that base wages rather than 
actual wages are more likely to be important in influencing employment decisions. 
6. Conclusions
The explosion in the availability of micro data on individual earnings has 
understandably led to researchers using this data to try to answer perennial questions 
in macroeconomics about the extent and nature of wage rigidity.  In this paper we 
have argued that care needs to be taken in interpreting such data and that one should 
not lose track of the fact that it is the cyclicality in the shadow price of labour in 
which we are ultimately interested. 
First, using high frequency firm-level data from the UK we have shown that 
there is a lot of volatility in average earnings per head at firm level.  This volatility is 
transitory but seems to be real.  Some of it is caused by variation in the composition 
of employment and some of it by variation in hours.  But, it also appears that a 
considerable part is real fluctuations in the payments from employers to individual 
workers that is not associated with variation in labour input.  With the only data 
available to us being at firm-level this conjecture needs to be checked with individual 
data from firms but it is consistent with the findings in Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir 
(2014) on the volatility in the actual payments from employers to individual workers.  
This volatility contrasts with the rigidity observed in base wages and in settlements 
data. 
The second conclusion of the paper is that this volatility in actual payments 
can exist because of frictions in the labour market and that these frictions mean that 
the base wage rather than actual payments are likely to be more important in 
determining the shadow price of labour that firms use in making decisions to hire or 
fire workers. 
13 Such fluctuations could not happen on prices charged for goods that are bought in a spot market and 
in which the equivalent of the hiring cost is low.  The large fluctuations in prices that we see (‘sales’) 
are probably designed to alter allocational decisions. 
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Table 1 















Number of observations 961026 773021 368777 722230 
Number of reporting units 31321 27047 13816 24947 



























































1. Weekly and monthly-paid figures only relate to firms that report non-zero
paybill and employment.
2. Full sample is January 2000-May 2010 inclusive.  Restricted sample is August
2000 – December 2008 inclusive.
3. Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
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Table 2 











Panel A. All Workers 
5th Percentile -0.126 -0.077 -0.089 -0.093 -0.080 
10th percentile -0.075 -0.045 -0.049 -0.051 -0.033 
25th percentile -0.025 -0.015 -0.014 -0.010 0.010 
Median 0.0018 0.0019 0.0076 0.018 0.037 
75th percentile 0.031 0.021 0.033 0.048 0.066 
90th percentile 0.082 0.053 0.071 0.090 0.110 
95th percentile 0.132 0.085 0.108 0.132 0.157 
% with wage cut 46.8 46.0 40.1 32.9 19.5 
Mean 0.0029 0.0029 0.0094 0.019 0.038 
Standard deviation 0.098 0.068 0.083 0.093 0.099 
Number of observations 885372 885372 817777 735714 600177 
Panel B. Weekly-Paid Workers 
5th Percentile -0.237 -0.233 -0.270 -0.292 -0.257 
10th percentile -0.143 -0.131 -0.151 -0.166 -0.141 
25th percentile -0.049 -0.040 -0.045 -0.045 -0.023 
Median 0.0017 0.0028 0.0088 0.019 0.039 
75th percentile 0.057 0.047 0.065 0.084 0.105 
90th percentile 0.149 0.139 0.175 0.211 0.232 
95th percentile 0.241 0.236 0.300 0.351 0.376 
% with wage cut 47.0 46.9 44.6 40.7 31.7 
Mean 0.0028 0.0035 0.011 0.023 0.047
Standard deviation 0.202 0.200 0.233 0.254 0.266 
Number of observations 337468 336274 307386 272935 217718 
Panel C. Monthly-Paid Workers 
5th Percentile -0.114 -0.075 -0.085 -0.096 -0.097 
10th percentile -0.065 -0.042 -0.046 -0.049 -0.038 
25th percentile -0.020 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 0.009 
Median 0.0008 0.0017 0.007 0.018 0.036
75th percentile 0.027 0.020 0.032 0.046 0.065 
90th percentile 0.072 0.050 0.068 0.086 0.107 
95th percentile 0.121 0.080 0.103 0.127 0.154 
% with wage cut 45.3 45.9 40.1 32.6 20.4 
Mean 0.003 0.0024 0.0084 0.017 0.033 
Standard deviation 0.115 0.082 0.098 0.110 0.125 
Number of observations 669324 667084 613624 548049 440737 
Notes. 
1. Weights come from the IDBR.
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Table 3 











Panel A. All Workers 
5th Percentile -0.126 -0.157 -0.130 -0.115 -0.088 
10th percentile -0.075 -0.097 -0.078 -0.067 -0.051 
25th percentile -0.025 -0.035 -0.027 -0.022 -0.017 
Median 0.0018 0.0011 0.0020 0.0022 0.0021 
75th percentile 0.031 0.042 0.033 0.029 0.023 
90th percentile 0.082 0.105 0.084 0.074 0.051 
95th percentile 0.132 0.162 0.135 0.121 0.096 
% with wage cut 46.8 47.2 47.2 46.7 46.1 
Mean 0.0029 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 0.0032 
Standard deviation 0.098 0.113 0.102 0.095 0.076 
Number of observations 885372 294928 222740 101142 266562 
Panel B. Weekly-Paid Workers 
5th Percentile -0.237 -0.240 -0.235 -0.233 -0.234 
10th percentile -0.143 -0.155 -0.143 -0.132 -0.133 
25th percentile -0.049 -0.059 -0.052 -0.043 -0.042 
Median 0.0017 0.000 0.0016 0.0028 0.0028 
75th percentile 0.057 0.066 0.058 0.050 0.050 
90th percentile 0.149 0.159 0.149 0.136 0.139 
95th percentile 0.241 0.243 0.239 0.231 0.237 
% with wage cut 47.0 46.9 47.5 46.8 46.9 
Mean 0.0028 0.0021 0.0024 0.0017 0.0034 
Standard deviation 0.202 0.187 0.196 0.201 0.206 
Number of observations 337468 102171 81287 36947 116869 
Panel C. Monthly-Paid Workers 
5th Percentile -0.114 -0.141 -0.118 -0.110 -0.085 
10th percentile -0.065 -0.082 -0.067 -0.062 -0.048 
25th percentile -0.020 -0.026 -0.022 -0.020 -0.016 
Median 0.0008 0.000 0.0012 0.0019 0.0019 
75th percentile 0.027 0.032 0.028 0.026 0.022 
90th percentile 0.072 0.089 0.075 0.069 0.056 
95th percentile 0.121 0.145 0.124 0.114 0.093 
% with wage cut 45.3 43.7 46.1 46.4 45.9 
Mean 0.003 0.0023 0.0027 0.0031 0.0030 
Standard deviation 0.115 0.119 0.110 0.109 0.095 
Number of observations 669324 202382 170923 80289 213490 
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Table 4 








5th Percentile ‐0.077  ‐0.093  ‐0.050 
10th percentile ‐0.045  ‐0.056  ‐0.030 
25th percentile ‐0.015  ‐0.019  ‐0.011 
Median  0.0019  0.0022  0.0016 
75th percentile  0.021  0.025  0.016 
90th percentile  0.053  0.062  0.038 
95th percentile  0.085  0.101  0.059 
% with wage cut  46.0  46.2  45.7 
Mean  0.0029  0.0028  0.0030 
Standard deviation  0.068  0.078  0.046 
Number of observations  885372  746641  138731 
Panel B. Weekly‐Paid Workers 
5th Percentile ‐0.237  ‐0.228  ‐0.239 
10th percentile ‐0.143  ‐0.130  ‐0.132 
25th percentile ‐0.049  ‐0.040  ‐0.041 
Median  0.0017  0.0030  0.0025 
75th percentile  0.057  0.047  0.046 
90th percentile  0.149  0.136  0.141 
95th percentile  0.241  0.230  0.241 
% with wage cut  47.0  46.7  47.2 
Mean  0.0028  0.0031  0.0040 
Standard deviation  0.202  0.180  0.222 
Number of observations  337468  283369  52905 
Panel C. Monthly‐Paid Workers 
5th Percentile ‐0.114  ‐0.091  ‐0.048 
10th percentile ‐0.065  ‐0.052  ‐0.029 
25th percentile ‐0.020  ‐0.018  ‐0.010 
Median  0.0008  0.0020  0.0012 
75th percentile  0.027  0.023  0.015 
90th percentile  0.072  0.059  0.038 
95th percentile  0.121  0.097  0.057 
% with wage cut  45.3  45.8  46.1 
Mean  0.003  0.0023  0.0026 
Standard deviation  0.115  0.097  0.050 
Number of observations  669324  559369  107715 
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Table 5 
Evidence for Rounding in Responses to the MWSS 
Percent  All Workers  Weekly‐Paid  Monthly‐Paid 
Paybill 
Ends in `000’  0.07  0.73  0.00 
Ends in `00’  0.22  2.25  0.02 
Ends in `0’  0.89  11.95  0.07 
Integer  6.61  100  0.28 
Employment 
Ends in `000’  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Ends in `00’  0.80  0.81  0.75 
Ends in `0’  10.41  10.45  10.16 
Source: Monthly Wage and Salary Survey 
Notes. 


























5th Percentile  ‐0.077  ‐0.080  ‐0.068  ‐0.259  ‐0.112  ‐0.090 
10th percentile  ‐0.045  ‐0.043  ‐0.041  ‐0.174  ‐0.064  ‐0.053 
25th percentile  ‐0.015  ‐0.011  ‐0.014  ‐0.082  ‐0.021  ‐0.019 
Median  0.0019  0.000  0.0019  0.0027  0.002  0.002 
75th percentile  0.021  0.019  0.020  0.094  0.028  0.026 
90th percentile  0.053  0.050  0.048  0.186  0.070  0.060 
95th percentile  0.085  0.084  0.075  0.275  0.117  0.095 
% with wage 
cut 
46.0  38.8  45.9  49.2  46.1  45.8 
Mean  0.0029  0.0026  0.0028  0.0051  0.003  0.003 
Standard 
deviation 
0.068  0.067  0.057  0.191  0.099  0.073 
Number of 
observations 
885372  139682  812763  72609  350784  309981 
Panel B. Weekly‐Paid Workers 
5th Percentile  ‐0.237  ‐0.266  ‐0.159  ‐0.459  ‐0.238  ‐0.213 
10th percentile  ‐0.143  ‐0.141  ‐0.094  ‐0.311  ‐0.142  ‐0.131 
25th percentile  ‐0.049  ‐0.035  ‐0.031  ‐0.127  ‐0.050  ‐0.047 
Median  0.0017  0.000  0.0029  0.0014  0.002  0.002 
75th percentile  0.057  0.039  0.038  0.130  0.057  0.053 
90th percentile  0.149  0.129  0.102  0.320  0.147  0.136 
95th percentile  0.241  0.242  0.168  0.480  0.246  0.224 
% with wage 
cut 
47.0  41.7  46.3  49.6  47.3  47.1 
Mean  0.0028  ‐0.006  0.0036  0.0035  0.002  0.003 
Standard 
deviation 
0.202  0.262  0.143  0.351  0.201  0.179 
Number of 
observations 
337468  59413  268127  68147  136467  115578 
Panel C. Monthly‐Paid Workers 
5th Percentile  ‐0.114  ‐0.076  ‐0.066  ‐0.306  ‐0.101  ‐0.085 
10th percentile  ‐0.065  ‐0.042  ‐0.039  ‐0.201  ‐0.056  ‐0.050 
25th percentile  ‐0.020  ‐0.010  ‐0.014  ‐0.091  ‐0.018  ‐0.017 
Median  0.0008  0.000  0.0017  ‐0.003  0.002  0.002 
75th percentile  0.027  0.017  0.019  0.091  0.025  0.023 
90th percentile  0.072  0.049  0.047  0.189  0.064  0.057 
95th percentile  0.121  0.087  0.073  0.284  0.108  0.092 
% with wage 
cut 
45.3  38.7  45.7  51.6  45.1  45.0 
Mean  0.003  0.0032  0.0028  ‐0.008  0.003  0.003 





669324  559369  107715  155640  256975  229759 
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-0.492 -0.528 -0.546 -0.521 -0.368 
10th 
percentile 
-0.262 -0.318 -0.336 -0.333 -0.201 
25th 
percentile 
-0.049 -0.098 -0.111 -0.118 -0.039 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 
75th 
percentile 
0.040 0.090 0.090 0.080 0.138 
90th 
percentile 
0.256 0.318 0.318 0.289 0.305 
95th 
percentile 
0.485 0.539 0.539 0.511 0.471 
Mean -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.012 0.045 
Standard 
deviation 
0.340 0.374 0.377 0.356 0.347 
Number of 
observations 
1069158 663900 3777371 163063 119955 
Notes. 
1. This data is taken from the LFS for the period 2000-2008 inclusive.
2. The statistics reported are for the distribution of the change in log weekly
paid hours for those who have not changed jobs.  Results are similar if
unpaid overtime is included.
3. The sample sizes fall because the number of observations 3-months apart
is larger than the number 12-months apart and because the number of the
people in the same job falls as the time interval increases.  Reporting the
distributions on a consistent sample makes little difference.
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Table 8 
The Relationship Between the Change in Weekly Earnings and the Change in 
Weekly Hours 
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Weekly Earnings 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in Log 
Weekly Hours 
0.263 0.180 0.086 0.239
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.061 0.053 0.051 0.054
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 102743 93690 39090 53951 
R-squared 0.072 0.036 0.009 0.063 






who are not paid 




who are paid by 
the hour 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 2000-2008 
Table 9 
The Reasons Why Hours Differ from Usual 
Reason why hours differ from usual Hourly Paid Not Hourly 
Paid 
All 
Hours/overtime varies  55.55 51.2 53.59 
bank holiday    8.11 10.81 9.33 
maternity, paternity leave    1.04 1.44 1.22 
other leave, holiday  21.38 25.04 23.03 
sick or injured    8.68 6.76 7.82 
training course    0.67 1.03 0.83 
started, changed jobs    0.23 0.12 0.18 
ended job    0.15 0.11 0.13 
bad weather    0.15 0.09 0.13 
labour dispute    0.06 0.03 0.05 
economic, other causes    0.38 0.2 0.3 
personal, family    1.13 0.98 1.07 
other reasons    2.43 2.16 2.31 
no reason given    0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number of observations 955246 
Source: Labour Force Survey, , 2000-2008 
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-0.369 -0.361 -0.082 -0.442 -0.392 
10th 
percentile 
-0.201 -0.213 -0.027 -0.252 -0.238 
25th 
percentile 
-0.039 -0.051 0.000 -0.067 -0.065 
Median 0.040 0.048 0.038 0.041 0.048 
75th 
percentile 
0.138 0.166 0.085 0.174 0.182 
90th 
percentile 
0.305 0.336 0.160 0.394 0.364 
95th 
percentile 
0.471 0.485 0.223 0.526 0.526 
% with wage 
cut 
31.2 35.3 18.7 34.8 36.8 
Mean 0.045 0.054 0.052 0.056 0.056 
Standard 
deviation 
0.347 0.341 0.178 0.342 0.342 










119955 118798 32331 31095 30956 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 2000-2008 
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Table 11: The volatility in gross weekly earnings: evidence of measurement error 







0 pay slips seen 0.33 0.38 0.41 
1 pay slip seen 0.32 0.35 0.37 
2 pay slips seen 0.31 0.32 0.30 
Note: Sample size is 118944 with overall standard deviation of 0.35 







0 pay slips seen 0.30 0.33 0.33 
1 pay slip seen 0.32 0.34 0.34 
2 pay slips seen 0.26 0.29 0.30 
Note: Sample size is 118944 with overall fraction of earnings cuts of 0.31 








0 pay slips seen 0.22 0.26 0.26 
1 pay slip seen 0.23 0.25 0.27 
2 pay slips seen 0.19 0.20 0.22 
Note: Sample size is 118944 with overall fraction of earnings cuts of 0.23 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 2000-2008  
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Table 12: The Sources of Wage Volatility 
Sample Standard 
Deviation of 














All 0.30 0.26 0.18 8089
Both earnings 
‘same as usual’ 




0.40 0.36 0.29 2699 (33%)
Hourly Paid 
All 0.32 0.29 0.21 5055
Both earnings 
‘same as usual’ 




0.41 0.37 0.30 1981 (39%)
Not Hourly Paid 
All 0.27 0.21 0.13 2997
Both earnings 
‘same as usual’ 




0.39 0.34 0.09 708 (24%)
Notes 
1. Data from Labour Force Survey, 2000-2008.  Sample restricted to those with
both pay slips seen and no proxy responses.
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January  6.3  6.1  10.3  11.7  23.2 
February  7.5  5.4  9.1  6.0  3.6 
March  9.6  8.4  7.1  4.8  4.5 
April  12.6  22.3  4.3  3.7  27.6 
May  11.0  10.3  5.8  6.0  5.6 
June  9.9  9.3  6.8  7.1  5.1 
July  8.2  10.1  8.5  7.6  11.1 
August  7.1  8.8  9.5  9.4  3.4 
September  7.2  4.0  9.4  7.8  3.4 
October  6.4  4.0  10.2  11.6  6.2 
November  6.7  5.0  9.8  12.8  4.1 




3771  871  4005  733
Notes. 
1. Columns (1) to (4) computed from MWSS.
2. Column (5) kindly provided by Peter Dolton from a database on pay
settlements – see Dolton, Makepeace and Tremayne (2012) for details. 
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